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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SOME INFLUENCES OF JUSTICE HOLMES' THOUGHT ON
CURRENT LAW-MONOPOLIES AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE
By
PERLIE

P. FALLON*

A study of monopolies and restraints of trade is dramatic and thereby interesting as a subject; and its importance is not confined to those affected by the
results flowing from variations in the development. There is an obj'ective interest
arising from the dramatic element which conflict creates.
The history of the Sherman Act is marked by tension at every stage of its
unfolding. The conflict is not always that of persons; nor the diversities of personal concern; there are conflicts of opinion; there are the tensions arising from
economic forces, vast in the sense that they exist as irresistible tendencies, and
hidden in the sense that their strength and direction are not observed nor noted
even by those whose fortunes they affect. A conflict exists between the popularly
held ideals and the economic forces, forces with the nature of the oceantide subject
to regulation and yet not to complete control. The history of monopolies and restraints of trade in our era is marked by the tension of struggle.
These incompatibles find as an ultimate binder the age-old and universal contest between the urge for oneness and the ideal of individualism, which now asserts itself in economics, and well stated in respect to the art forms of the period
by Nietzsche:
"... the mystery doctrine of tragedy: The fundamental knowledge of the
oneness of everything existent, the conception of individuation as the
prime cause of evil, and of art as the joyous hope that the bonds of individuation may be broken in augury of a restored oneness."'
Tension arises in matching production and distribution. Marx, in earlier work,
as economist, viewing the industrial revolution, in its beginning, saw the basic problem as an equipose of production and distribution. This analysis was accepted;
the cartel form, since common in Europe, is the pattern. Henry Ford referred before the Temporary National Economic Committee to an era of mass production,
and to mass consumption as its counterpart; Professor Ezekiel there said that we
had not learned in times of peace to maintain a purchasing power equal to the
goods and services we are able to produce. Professor Beard, a student of American
reactions believes, without in this instance reflecting the general popular view, that
our destiny is a technological society continental in scope. The factual background
* Clark University A.B.; Columbia University LL.B.

I The quotation from Frederick Nietzsche is found in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE-THE
BIRTH OF TRAGEDY. The Modern Library. The translation is by Clifton P. Fadiman.
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of the cases now to be reviewed reflects this tension between production and distribution in distress sugar, distress coal and distress oil; overproduction unable
to find an outlet at a price consistent with the stability of the market. Justice
Holmes, while yet in the Massachusetts Supreme Court, as early as 1896, in Vegelaban v. Gunter2 stated that a superficial reading of industrial history made plain
that free competition means combination, of an ever increasing might and scope.
This occurred in a dissent where Holmes upheld peaceful picketing as a proper
incident of labor combination.
The conflict of ideas is present in the remedial changes which economic conditions made necessary. There is a diversity of approach. The United States Steel and
internationalHarvester cases approved vertical expansion; statutes later fixed the
price of bituminous coal. Cooperative action in the milk industry under supervision
of the Department of Agriculture was legalized. For a time a like condition prevailed in the oil industry. The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized
to approve consolidations of railways. Marketing arrangements in respect to raisins,
controlled by state action, were approved. Distinction was made, however, between
action under state or national authority and private action. The means approved
by public action became illegal in the mi!k and oil industries when initiated by
private persons. Existing monopolies of the press consisting of membership associations and in insurance consisting of rating bureaus were opened up by decision
or statute so that all might enter. Public regulation spread but did not override the
Sherman Act. The suit brought by the State of Georgia against the railroads3 places
the Sherman Act in an overriding position; the control exercised by the Interstate
Commerce Commission was there rej'ected as a defense. In all the variations the
Sherman Act thus remains dominant. The paramount idea in the Sherman Act is
the exclusion of coercion. This concept appears in all of the cases. Trends of cartelization give way to price leadership; coercion is alvays excluded. It is the political
idea in which the Sherman Act originated. Meantime economic forces have become
more potent than political ideas.
The period of Holmes' various opinions from the Supreme Bench is marked
by technological advance. Industrial expansion is in a developing stage. The problems created thereby were emerging. Holmes' opinions reflect the issues; and his
work, 'especially the earlier opinions, permit us to see the problems of monopoly
and restraint of trade in their beginnings. In the earlier part of the period we call
separate the various factors; the later period of solutions is on the contrary marked
by constant change and flux. The remedial actions begin in the latter part of the
period and appear only at the close of Holmes' service in the Court. There was an
attempt at remedial action after 1914 in the Clayton Act. The period is also one
2 161 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
s The suit brought by Georgia against the railroads appears in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U. S. 439, 65 Sup. Ct. 716, 89 L. Ed. 1051 (1945).
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of definition. Form was given to the Sherman Act. The meaning of the statute
was defined; conspiracy, and intent were defined. The statute assumed a certain
character. In this period also the states were acting in the field of monopolies
and restraint of trade; the patterns which the states used were later to be copied
and expanded by the Federal Government. The states were using price fixing as a
means of control; not the cooperative price fixing which federal statutes authorized
in the thirties; it is, however, that form of approach used in a negative way. Tyson
and Brother v. Banton 4 is an example; there Holmes, in his dissent, casts many of
the Lockeian ideas aside and relies upon a use of police power. Down this road
the succeeding decade marched; the police power became the basis of action in the
exercise of both state and federal power.
Holmes' opinions lift us from conflict to reconciliation, which is a difference
of approach; it is not a reconciliation of the forces at work in the economy. The
conflict of solutions came in the years following the period we review. Holmes'
views define the 'emerging problems and indicate the background of the later remedial solutions. The opinions have a marked quality. Holmes is entirely nonpolitical in the sense that he is never partisan, his approach is objective, he does
not join any of th& conflicting forces, he has no view point. He was criticised that
he did not make surveys. His role was otherwise, he became the arbiter of the ultimate facts, detachment was necessary. If a certain dramatic interest is missing because Holmes fought no battles and took no side, there is thereby, an intenser value
in his work. There are two salient features in the work which create its values,
namely, objectiveness in the presence of the merging problems, and an appreciation
of the factors which are at work. Thus, Holmes was able to say, in Massachusetts,
that competition, in an industrial era, meant combination, and later, in Tyson and
Brother v. Banton, to point to the rising tide of the police power. Reconciliation
arises in Holmes' thought, beyond the objective and the analytical, in the suggestion,
even the assumption, of society equal to self discipline. The means used is elucidation, it has the quality of creative work as desrcibed by Coleridge: 5
"This power . . . reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of
opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the
general, with the concrete; the idea with the image; the individual with
the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion with more than usual
order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession with enthusiasm
and feeling profound or vehement...
In this article I shall analyze Justice Holmes' opinions respecting monopolies
and restraint of trade. Since they cover a variety of matters, synthesis is necessary,
and, therefore, a method of approach. The material adapts itself into two broad
divisions, namely, the Sherman Act, and the powers of the states, The part relating
4 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718 (1927).
5 The quotation from Coleridge is found in the BIOGRAMH!% LITERARIA, J.
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to the Sherman Act is marked by two further divisions, namely, the scope of the
statute, and the definition of the statute in its legal sense. This division is arbitrary
if a purely legalistic approach is made; there any difference between the
scope and the definition of the statute disappears and leaves solely a question of
law. Since the cases, as an entirety, show that the intent of Congress is ultimately
determined by the Court, there is ground for separating the scope of the statute
and its definition. Definition emerges only where scope is left beyond dispute. So,
there are three divisions, the scope of the Sherman Act, the definition of the Sherman Act, and the powers of the states. The scope of the statute develops in these
topics: (1) competition; (2) price fixing; which subdivides into: (a) action by producers, (b) lateral agreements, (c) indirect and associational activity; and, (3) integration and size. The definition of the statute evolves in the headings: (1) patents, (2) labor unions, (3) intent, (4) conspiracy, (5) the effect of violations
on contract relations, (6) action outside the United States, (7) suits by private
persons. The powers of the states unfold under the themes: (1) classification
under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) statutory standards and remedies, and
(3) price fixing.
We consider now tht scope of the Sherman Act, by examining Holmes' views
on competition. The source is the dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Company v. United States. 6 There, the appeal brought up for review a decree of the
Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota, entered in an equity suit, brought by
the United States, and which enjoined the Northern Securities Company from acquiring any further stock of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, or the Great
Northern Railway Company, from voting stock already acquired, from paying
dividends thereon; and also forbade the exercise of any control over the railways
by the Northern Securities Company; and found that the stock already held was acquired by a conspiracy in restraint of trade and in violation of the Sherman Act.
Th'e decree was affirmed. Four justices dissented; Justices White and Holmes
wrote separate dissenting opinions and the dissenters concurred in each.
The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway
Company were competing and mainly parallel lines from the Great Lakes and the
Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean at Puget Sound. The Northern Pacific properties became insolvent and receivers were appointed. The bondholders attempted
a reorganization by consolidation with the Great Northern. It was enjoined on the
application of a stockholder of the Great Northern under a Minnesota statute forbidding the merger of railroads having parallel or competing lines. Messers. Hill
and Morgan, stockholders in the respective companies, and their associate shareholders, then formed a holding company, under the laws of New Jersey, known
as The Northern Securities Company, and the holding company exchanged its
capital stock for a controlling interest in the capital stock of each of the railway
6 193 U. S. 197,.24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679 (1904).
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companies. Meanwhile the two railways had acquired control of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company by giving their joint bonds in exchange for
capital stock.
The majority of the justices found on the facts that the separate railway companies ceased, under the arrangement, to be in active competition along their respective lines and became a consolidated corporation with the principal, if not
the sole object, of eliminating competition. This combination was held to be a trust,
or at least a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, as defined in the Sherman Act, since the combination was a restraint upon the freedom of commerce
which Congress intended to protect and which the public interest required.
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, first analyzed the statute. Sec. 1 of
the statute reaches two classes of cases, namely, contracts in restraint of trade, and
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Contracts in restraint of trade
were at common law those restricting the freedom of the contractor in carrying on
his business as he otherwise would. The objection to these was on the contractor's
own account. The point Holmes has in mind here is currently described as injury
to initiative. Combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade were efforts to keep
others out of the business, and the objection to these was their effect upon strangers
and a supposed consequent effect on the public at large. Public policy excludes
these because such agreements monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce. Sec. 2 of the statute imposes like penalties as Sec. 1 upon a single person
who, without combination, monopolizes or attempts to monopolize commerce
among the states. The reference to "trusts" is to a sinister power exercised by a
combination in keeping rivals out and ruining those already in business. Sec. 7 gives
an action to a person injured in his business or property by the forbidden conduct.
It refers to outsiders.
Holmes' views on competition appear in this analysis of the statute and are
then expanded as consequences. The statute says nothing about competition; it
does not look primarily to competition. Combination in restraint of trade and monopoly both connote the exclusion of strangers to the combination. The words of the
statute do not require all existing competition to be kept, and only prevent the repression of competition by contracts or combinations in restraint of trade; and the
evil character of these flows from other features than the suppression of competition. The statute is directed against the ferocious extremes of competition with
others. The abolition of competition by any form of union is not unlawful. Holmes
makes two references to consequences: the purpose of the statute is not the universal disintegration of society into single men "each at war with all the rest;"-not
the reconstruction of society.
The majority of the justices held that a limitation of competition was per se
a violation of the statute; Holmes did not agree either in the reading of the statute
or in the possible consequences; the statute was directed at the abridgment of free-
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dom by coercion; the public interest must be viewed in relation to an industrial and
technological era; and the problems could not be solved by disintegrating such a
society into atoms.
The depth of this opinion is in the exact analysis of th'e factors at work in
the economy. The National Recovery Act, the cooperative price fixing arrangements, the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to authorize consolidation of railways and motor carriers (AcLean Trucking Co. v. United States7) later
justified Holmes' position. The opinion rests on three ideas: legal freedom to engage in independent business adventures, recognition of the 'expanding nature of an
industrial and technological society, and self discipline as a means of control rather
than a society of single men 'each at war with all of the rest.
Price is a basic factor in the exchange of goods; under orthodox theory it is
fixed by the market; it relates to loss and profit. It is a weather vane in the economic
system. Veblen put the price system and the industrial system in opposition; the
former emphasizing profit, the latter emphasizing production; and believed production the better social objective. Others believe that profit supports initiative.
In this part of our review we meet three forms of action respecting prices namely;
(1) action by producers; (2) action by lateral agreement; and (3) indirect and
associational activity. There is a natural transition in the subject at this point; in
the first opinion we consider Justice Holmes reviewing action by producers,
xestates his concept of competition; and in a later opinion, concerning indirect
and associational activity, discusses the control of competition by the limitation
of production.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co.8 brought up for review the dismissal of a bill of complaint for want of equity. The lower court had held that the
plaintiff, a producer of proprietary medicines, might not have injunctive relief
against those inducing its wholesale agents and retailers to breach contracts by
which they had agreed not to sell the plaintiff's products below the wholesale
and retail prices fixed by the contract. The agreement with the jobbers and wholesalers was open to construction as either consignment or sale. The majority interpreted the bill as extending to sales between the jobbers and wholesale dealers. The
retail agreement was cl'early a sale and not an agency contract. The majority of the
Justices held that the exercise of control was not by virtue of production and ownership but by agreement which was invalid since it destroyed competition among
the dealers and fixed prices contrary to the public interest.
The Sherman Act is not directly involved; there is a refusal to allow equitable
relief because of public policy, much as in the later case of Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co. 9 where a licensor attempted to extend by agreement a patent monopoly
on machinery to salt tablets.
7 321 U. S. 67, 64 Sup. Ct. 370, 88 L. Ed. 544 (1944).
8 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911).
9 314 U. S. 488, 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed. 363 (1942).
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Justice Holmes defined the issue as whether a purchaser might contract that
he would not sell the goods below a certain price, and marked the ground of the
majority holding as the benefit to consumers and the general public. He would
not accept that idea; the value and importance to the public of competition in
production or distribution and in fixing a fair price is exaggerated. The decisive
factor in competition is conflicting desire making choice necessary. When the
price of a desired something rises above the point of a willingness to give up other
things buying stops. Necessaries are different and must "sooner or later be dealt
with like rations in a shipwreck." Profitable return depends upon an equilibrium
of several desires which determines the fair price. Knaves cut reasonable prices for
ulterior purposes and production and sale are impaired. Combinations in restraint
of trade are not here involved since they exclude others from a business naturally
open to them. The underlying idea of this dissent is that of a free enterprise system; the method of approach is the application of Say's Law to the economy as a
whole rather than to segments of it.
On the law Justice Holmes went beyond the seller announcing in advance a
resale price as a matter of right; he allowed a means of activation by agreement.
The majority concurred in the former concept; but it believed that in agreement a
coercive element might be present. United States v. Colgate Co. 10 brings out the
first part of Holmes' thesis; it held that an indictment will not lie under the Sherman Act because of the fixing of resale prices and a refusal to deal with those
who do not conform. The majority's view on the second concept in Holmes' thesis
is illustrated by United States v. Schrader'sSon Inc.; 1 there the indictment was sustained upon agreements, express or implied, that the resale prices be observed.
Holmes, without opinion, dissented.
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce" came under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commision by Sec. 5 of the Clayton Act in 1914, and Justice
Holmes reasserted his thought on price fixing by producers. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-nut Co. 12 brought up a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit which set aside an order of th-e Federal Trade Commission
requiring the respondent to cease and desist from a plan of resale of its products,
whereby it selected jobbers, wholesalers and retailers willing to resell at prices it
suggested and insisted that they discontinue sales to all others who cut the suggested price, limited turn over orders solicited by its salesmen to those who observed
the price, and maintained a list of selected customers to which it added or removed
names upon the basis of declarations to maintain the price, and devised a method
of marking its goods in order to trace price cutters.
The majority of the Justices held that the plan was unlawful under the statute
on the ground that it constrained the trader to maintain the prices suggested and
10 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992 (1919).
11 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct. 251, 64 L. Ed. 471 (1920).
12 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup. Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307 (1922).
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thereby suppressed competition among the retail distributors. Justice Holmes narrowed the basis of the decision in his dissent; the guilt was a dangerous tendency
to hinder competition or to create monopoly; the respondent had a monopoly of
its own goods; no one could compete with it. The action taken hindered competition among those who purchased for resale; yet, under the law, this competition
depended upon the will of the respondent. The statute refers to unfair methods
of competition. To whom is the respondent's conduct unfair? Thus we return to the
nature of competition and the process controlling prices in a fr'ee economy discussed
by the diss'ent in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co., and there attributed to conflicting desires as the regulators of the market. Holmes was far
from hedonistic. His ambition was different; "-to believe when the end comes,
for till then it is always in doubt, that one has touched the superlative."'" That adjective can hardly apply to the view of competition found in the two dissents. The
productivity of the industrial age, however, had not yet been appraised. The first
dissent was written in 1911, before Veblen had noted, in the wilderness, the unbounded productive capacity of the machines, an idea neither presented nor suggested by the material before the Court. Later the police power became the means
of those who held to the theory of wider consumption, and there we shall find
that Holmes had a part.
These dissents later became a part of the Sherman Act; the Miller-Tydings Act
of 1937 made contracts prescribing minimum prices for the resale of commodities
bearing a trade mark lawful when permitted as intrastate transactions. The conflict, however, continued. Th-e Final Report of the Temporary National Economic
Committee found unanimously that the price fixing laws undermined the advantages of mass production to the consumer. The Sherman Act remains, neverth'eless,
the overriding power where price fixing agreements, authorized by state statutes,
are a part of coercive purpose in respect to interstate commerce. United Slates v.
Frankfort Distilleries14 is a recent decision on that point.
What defines competition? Is competition the war of 'every man with every
other man? Is existing competition holy? Is competition solely the right to be free
from coercion? Is price control by producers a restraint of competition? Are agreements fixing resale prices coercive in an evil way? Are conflicts in social desires
determinants of competition? Is mass distribution on the widest scale the test of
competition? Is mass distribution possible under the competition of the market as
defined by Say?
We find in these problems a clash of ideas which, how-ever, does not make
the entire pattern; also, there is a clash of economic forces, the necessity and demand for a share of distribution meets the older idea of owner control. Justice
Holmes saw combination as the heritage of an industrial era. How clearly he real13 The reference to Justice Holmes' ambition is found in the
Harvard University Press.
14 324 U. S. 293, 65 Sup. Ct. 661, 89 L. Ed. 951 (1945).
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ized the need for mass distribution and the demand for participation in mass distribution is not yet apparent. Thus far he has asserted the idea that a free market
still has a place. Our review, however, is not yet complete. We must await the
opinions in which Justice Holmes discusses the Sherman Act as part of a police
power necessary to control combination in aid of the natural laws of competition.
We reach that part now in considering lateral agreements.
Lateral agreements are arrangements among two or more competitors designed
to fix the prices of goods in a given industry. On this subject we shall examine
one opinion by Justice Holmes; he wrote but one in this field of price control.
This expression on lateral price control influenced a later decision of the Court
on lateral agreements, and also foreshadows decisions in the field of indirect and associational activity which the Court reached across a dissent by Holmes entered
in an intervening case. This single opinion on lateral agreement price fixing is
interesting because it reflects the precise character of Holmes' thought in the capacity to define and the courage to exclude; but its interest does not cease there; neither
does its influence on later decisions entirely define its value. It clarifies the nature
of the offense of lateral price fixing under the Sherman Act by defining its essence,
an influence of value in view of the confusions which arose later in disposing of
reasonableness as a price test.
Swift and Company v. Uniled States'" was an appeal from the Circuit Court
of the United States for the North'ern District of Illinois. A bill in equity alleged
violations of the Sherman Act in that the defendants, engage in buying live stock
and selling fresh meats in divers states, had combined to restrain competition
among themselves by: refraining from bidding in order to depress prices; artificial
bidding in order to stimulate shipments; monopolizing commerce by combining
"to arbitrarily, from time to time, raise, lower and fix prices, and to maintain
uniform prices at which they will sell"; making uniform charges for cartage, which
otherwise would be without charge; and, arranging with railroads to receive rebates
and rates less than the lawful rate. The bill had a general allegation that the defendants were in conspiracy with each other, with the railroads, and with others,
to obtain a monopoly of the supply and the distribution of fresh meats. The defendants demurred to the bill, whereby, they admitted the facts alleged and rested

upon the point that the bill did not set forth definite or specific facts within the
statute. The trial court overruled the demurrer and an injunction issued. Justice
Holmes wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court sustaining the decree.
The vital element in the opinion is Holmes' approach. He 'excludes any discussion of the separate items as entities; the acts, each standing alone, may be lawful. The earlier sections of the bill alleged an intent to restrain competition among
the defendants. An intent to monopolize appeared in the eighth section pertaining
to raising, lowering and fixing prices. The general allegation of a conspiracy of the
Is

196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518 (1905).
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defendants with each other, with railroads, and with others to monopolize the supply and distribution of fresh meats colored all of the specific charges as the successive elements of a single connected scheme. The law is then applied to the facts
in these words: "the statute gives this proceeding against combinations in restraint
of commerce among the states and against attempts to monpolize the same." Holmes
examined the facts alleged and the allegation of intent and finding them within
the statute declined to go further. Price fixing was alleged in the bill as part of a
scheme to monopolize commerce and it was colored by the general allegation that
the defendants were conspiring with one another, the railroads, the others to monopolize the supply and distribution of fresh meats. The essence of the offense was
the combination in restraint of trade and the conspiracy and intent to monoplize.
Thus the statute dominates the facts; the general absorbs the particular; the tvidence is drawn into the law; and there finds its significance.
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 16 decided in 1940, the opinion
stated: "Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation
adhered to the principle that price fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act.. ." (p. 218) The case, brought up by certiorari, involved a conviction
in criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act of oil companies on an indictment
and jury finding that the defendants had conspired to raise and maintain the spot
market prices of gasoline and the prices to jobbers and consumers through buying
up distress gasoline and removing it as a market factor; there was an arrangement
for the control of spot market gasoline by ascertaining its quantity and arranging
for its purchase. The trial court had charged the jury that if the combination had
the power to raise the prices and had acted together for that purpose the combination was illegal and the reasonableness of the prices was not a factor in the matter.
The Court charged however that the price rise must be caused by the combination.
The Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction on the ground that the
trial court's charge was based on the theory of such a combination being illegal
per se.
As yet we have not reached a discussion of price fixing by indirect action and
associational activity; lateral agreements merge with that field of law not upon the
facts, which are quite different, but upon Justice Holmes' definition of the offense under the Sherman Act-so penetrating in its analysis that it clarifes the
application of the law to either set of facts. The discussion in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. is of interest in that it gives a basis of contrast and thereby a test of Holmes' view; and the comparison becomes more helpful still if we
17
bring into the equation the decision in Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States,
a case decided after Holmes had retired from the Court.
The approach which Holmes made in Swift and Company v. United States
rested on the concept that the Sherman Act was directed at combinations in restraint
16 310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940).

17 288 U. S. 344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471, 77 L Ed. 825 (1933).
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of trade and attempts to monopolize; it absorbed the price fixing allegation into
these terms. Appalachian Coals Inc. vs. United States finds its rationale in the approach which Holmes used in Swift and Company v. United States. A brief statement of the facts is necessary. The suit was in equity. Coal producers in Virginia,
West Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee had formed an exclusive sales organization known as Appalachian Coals Inc., with power to fix prices except on sales
for future delivery. The trial court found there was concerted action which affected
the market and tended to stabilize prices and raise prices to a higher level than free
competition would permit. The facts showed that the -capacity of the mines exceeded the demand; distress coal existed under competitive conditions; the sales
agency was organized to remove the distress conditions. An injunction was issued.
The Supreme Court reversed the decree and dismissed the bill without prejudice
on the ground that the evidence showed the defendants could not fix the price of
coal in the consuming market. The defendants had fixed their own prices; sales
were not made in the territory but at points where competition was met from other
fields of production.
The tensions which arise from commercial action under the Sherman Act
produce further and different action, and result in variations in commercial attitude
and action. The cases we have thus far reviewed, and the associational activity cases
which we review next, lead to price leadership. There is another case which influenced the trend of commercial action; therefore, United States v. Trenton Potteries1 8 must be brought into our review. The defendants were found guilty upon a
jury verdict in criminal proceedings under the Sherman Act. The indictment charged
a combination to fix and maintain uniform prices for the sale of sanitary pottery in
restraint of commerce. The defendants asked the trial court for a charge which the
Supreme Court construed as submitting to the jury an issue on the reasonableness
of the prices which resulted from the combination. The Supreme Court held that
the trial court properly withdrew this issue from the jury and properly charged
that an agreement by the members of a combination respecting prices which the
members charged for their commodity was in itself an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade. Justice Holmes joined in the decision. The combination controlled
82 per cent of the production; the Court held that a combination to control prices
in so large a part of the industry was a restraint of trade. In a narrower view the
defendants asserted that the reasonableness of the prices was a material fact. In
Swift and Company v. United States Holmes subordinated price fixing to the statutory proscription of restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize. The reasonableness of the prices created by a combination in restraint of trade was within
this test once a restraint arising from combination appeared.
Justice Holmes approached lateral price fixing in Swift and Company v. United States upon the statutory ultimates of combination to restrain trade and attempts
18 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 71 L. Ed. 700 (1927).
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to monopolize; a position based on good statutory construction, and economically
necessary, as the facts in Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States later demonstrated. The view that price fixing per se is unlawful implies th'e additional facts of
combination and restraint, and rests on the point that the reasonableness of the forbidden action is immaterial.
The decision in Swift and Company v. United States, that lateral agreements
creating monopoly by conspiracies respecting prices are void, when taken with
the emphasis on price agreements per se in United States v. Trenton Potteries opencd the way to associational activity and indirect price fixing through price leadership. Such associational activity is now our subject. Associational activity is gen%rally concerned with production. Production, however, affects price. The relation
between production and distribution is a vital price factor. Marx saw this problem
at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution; Veblen focused economic attention
on the relation in the American economy during the period of Holmes' judicial
work. We shall here explore further Holmes' concept of a free market in his opinions concerning private effort to control supply and demand. We reach here the
contribution Holmes made to the process of reconciliation. We find the philosophy
by which Holmes sought to bring the conflicting factors in the economy, and the
conflict between the statute and the economy, into accord. The pattern of the sequence is dissent, then the recognition of a necessary limitation of the position
taken in order to bar coercion, and, finally, the acceptance of Holmes' views by
the majority. This sequence is a dramatic incident. The definition of a free market
as includifIg knowledge, the necessity for the exchange of information respecting
vital market factors, the reconciliation of economic diversities through self discipline, acting for the benefit of the community as a whole, are the concepts worthy
of our interest.
American Column Co. v. United States"9 was an appeal from the District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee; it brought up for review a decree
granting a permanent injunction under the Sherman Act forbidding the continuance of a trade association. Mills manufacturing hardwood in the Southwest
had formed the American Hardwood Manufacturers Association which set in operation among its members an "Open Competition Plan" on the theory that knowledge of prices would keep prices at stable and normal levels. The members made
a daily report of their sales, including exact copies of orders taken, and of their
shipments, including copies of invoices. They reported monthly on production
and stock and filed price lists for the ensuing month showing the shipping point
on which the prices were based. The association made an independent inspection
of grading for the purpose of comparing prices. The secretary of the association
sent the members weekly reports of sales, including the price and name of the purchaser, monthly summaries of production and the stock of each member, the pros19 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 114, 66 L. Ed. 284 (1921).
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pective monthly price lists of other members, reports of market conditions and of
changes in the producing and consuming ends of the industry. The members met
monthly for discussion; later they met weekly and in districts. Questionnaires developed in detail information on production and distribution. At the meetings and
in the literature distributed to members the officers warned against overproduction,
price shading and price cutting, and urged a price level creating reasonable profit.
If a member did not report pursuant to the plan, the overall report of the secretary
was not sent, and membership ceased upon failure to report for twelve days in
a period of six months.
The majority of the Court held that the plan was a combination to restrict
production and increase prices by agreement and a direct restraint upon commerce.
It found that the purpose was to secure harmonious individual action in respect to
production and prices, among naturally competing dealers, without specific agreement, under the direction of a single interpreter of the purpose. The plan was
found to have sanctions, coercive power, in business honor and in possible social
penalties since the reports exposed immediately any deviator to his associates.
Justice Holmes dissented. Knowledge of the stock on hand, of the probable
demand, and of the prices paid would tend to equalize the prices asked. But intelligent interchange in commerce depends upon full knowledge of the facts, and
combination to obtain and distribute such knowledge is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. While the combination here is of sellers only, it may be assumed
that buyers are not less active. Unreasonable restraint of trade is an attempt to override the normal market; attempts to conform to normal market conditions are reasonable acts. The members are not bound by any sanctions that would not obtain
in an all wise socialistic government acting for the community's benefit. The members are free to follow the plan or not as they wish.
Justice Holmes agreed with the majority's concept that coercion being present
such a plan was invalid. In the subsequent case of United States v. American Linseed Oil Co. 21 Justice Holmes concurred in holding a plan invalid where the record
showed that the members deposited government bonds as security for performance
of the arrangement and they agreed to a forfeiture upon a breach of the plan,
and where there was evidence also of policing by the association.
Let us turn now to the two cases in which the majority finally accepted the
views which Justice Holmes had expressed in American Column Co. v. United
States by dissent. The names of these cases are Maple FlooringManufacturersAssociation v. United States2 and Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v.
United States;22 decided on June 1, 1925, about five years after the decision in
American Column Co. v. United States. Justice Holmes was sitting in Court.
20 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607, 67 L. Ed. 1035 (1923).
21 268 U. S.563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578, 69 L.Ed. 1093 (1925).
22 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 588, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (1925).
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The appeal in Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States
was from a decree of the District Court for the Western District of Michigan
awarding an injunction to the government under the Sherman Act. The owners
of timber lands and sawmills producing or purchasing rough lumber from which
they made finished flooring had formed a trade association. The association computed and distributed the average costs of flooring among the members, distributed
j. booklet stating the freight rates from Cadillac, Michigan to several thousand
points in the United States, gathered and supplied information as to sales, prices
and inventories, which it had collected from members, and held monthly meetings
for discussion of the industry and for an exchange of views. The decree was reversed and the activities declared valid under the Sherman Act. The Court held
that neither price fixing nor coercion was established and that the gathering and
distribution of information on the essential elements of a business and the application of individual intelligence to production, prices, or transportation costs,
were not restraints of trade even where the result tended to equalize prices.
Cement Manufacturers ProtectiveAssociation v. United States brought up for
review, by appeal, a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York enjoining the continuance of a trade association among certain manufacturers
of cement. The business of the members was largely in contracts for future delivery
wherein they undertook to supply cement for a specific job-a particular building
or road-and without binding the purchaser to take a given quantity; the specified
price declined with the market; thus the contracts were of an optional nature. On
rising markets buyers would at times take an advantage by calling for more cement
than the specified job required. The association investigated the various buyers'
needs and supplied this information to its members and thereby orders in excess
of the contract were refused; the association also distributed books showing the
freight rates from certain basing points to numerous places of delivery. The members exchanged credit information; there were monthly meetings and discussion.
The decree was reversed on the grounds stated in Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Association v. United States; and it was further held that the gathering of information to prevent imposition was not a restraint of trade since the members were
left free to act or not to act and that this result followed even if most of the sellers
would in ordinary course act upon the information and refuse to make deliveries
which were not within the contracts.
Justice Holmes concurred in these opinions.
In both cases the associational activity related in some of its aspects to freight
rates; in the cement case the basing point is suggested. The validity of the basingpoint system was sustained there because of the absence of any agreement respecting the basing points, which also had the sanction of prior individual use, and the
necessity of adjusting the individual price to the freight rate in order to allow all
mills to compete in any territory; the book stating the various freight rates thereby served the purposes of competition. The use did not extend to a system of de-
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livered prices reached by agreement. Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States23 illustrates the contrast; there concerted action created an inference of agreement. Furthermore the basing system was not discriminatory. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission2 4 and Federal Trade Commission v. Staley Manufacturing
Co. 25 are also cases in contrast; in the latter cases deliveries were made from a
point more adjacent and the price computed on the basing point. In the cement
case there was adjustment in the price in order to equalize the freight rate. The
basing-point system, when implemented by agreement, results in price uniformity
on delivered goods regardless of the point of delivery or point of origin; it makes
location immaterial. Rebates and hidden allowances to purchasers disturb the stability of the market. These practices are indicated in many of the cases; Swift and
Company v. United States is an example among the opinions written by Justice
Holmes. Control may thus be necessary for the purpose of enforcing discipline,
and there is, therefore, an incentive to equalize disturbing conditions which competition creates. The Temporary National Economic Committee recommended that
the basing-point system be declared illegal by federal legislation, allowing, however, a brief time for readjustment since relocation of plant equipment would result; it found that the system created plant concentration and implemented the efforts of combinations to fix prices. Justice Holmes' opinions do not discuss the
basing-point system. It is a later development of the conflicting interests and economic forces which rest within the range of the Sherman Act. We can, therefore,
now sum up Justice Holmes' contribution to the problem of associational activity
in terms of the specific problem with which he dealt; that concerned associational
activity in the control of production.
The reconciliation of conflicting statutory provisions is judicial work requiring a high degree of capacity; the reconciliation of the conflicts which emerge from
an economy, the conflicts b'ctween production and distribution for example, an
issue mingling with the issues of personal interest, demands a creative capacity
exceeding that of the judicial process and needs not only an analytical approach
to the facts but a philosophic bent of mind placing the emphasis on "knowing"
rather than on "doing". The presence of this talent may not be denoted by a negative approach. Therefore, in assaying Justice Holmes' work in the opinions discussed in this section we must first put to one side the negative qualities of his
work. Justice Holmes did not approve conspiracies fixing prices that created
monopoly; he did not approve coercion in associational activity; he did not approve
conspiracies creating monopolies by interference with established freight rates. These
are the negative side of his work. There is a further and constructive trait, constructive in the sense that it is creative, and creative in the sense that it brings cooperation and self disciplin-e to the surface as a means in reconciliation of the
28 297 U. S.553, 56 Sup. Ct. 629, 80 L. Ed. 859 (1936).
24 324 U. S. 726, 65 Sup. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320 (1945).
25 324 U. S.746, 65 Sup. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed. 1338 (1945).
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conflicts characterizing the free market in an industrial ra. The free market in
Justice Holmes' conception rested on knowledge of all of the factors in the market
and the use of intelligence by both buyer and seller whereby commerce became "an
intelligent interchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the future. . ." The free market in theory created profit and the motivation
of cooperative action rested in the preservation of a free market in the interests of
the community as a whole. The element of coercion is rejected, and the necessar,
harmony flows from self discipline and enlightened selfishness. The concept is not
hortatory only, but realistic in the sense that Emerson's law of compensation is
realistic. It has justification in experience. Historically the peoples who have excelled in commercial affairs have had a keen sense of responsiveness to law as
the foundation of stability in affairs. The Romans and the English are examples.
The interest of these peoples in their legal systems was not only intense but also
omnipresent. The self discipline that reflects responsiveness to law, a responsiveness that is natural and spontaneous, inherent and intuitive, in turn creates the
stability on which the success of commerce depends. The responsiveness to law
and to commercial sense are thus the reverse sides of the same medal; they are
evidences of character and of a sense of form. To the problem of the normal market
justice Holmes applied creatively the legal process of reconciliation.
There is a further quality of Justice Holmes' work in this field. It rests in
the elucidation of the economic and legal truths involved. The method and the
purpose are stated simply and explained clearly whereby the best that is thought
and known becomes current. Matthew Arnold has summed up this type of effort
as the ultimate expression of the social ideal and described the men who undertake
it as the true apostles of equality:
"The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for
diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the
other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have labored
to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract,
professional, exclusive; to humanize it, to make it efficient outside the
clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness
andlight.".s
Emerson, Arnold, and Justice Holmes used cultural development as a means
of reaching practical ideals. The history of monopolies and restraint of trade is
marked by conflict, and the problems, divers in nature, have created a diversity
of remedies. The Mirror of Justice has many uses. Addison pointed out that it not
only separates the gold from the dross, but has also a compulsory process whereby
it may adapt recalcitrant powers to its purpose. The opinions we have just examined
are the expression by Justice Holmes of the ideal state--of the "ought" rather than
the "must". In the third part of this paper we shall review Justice Holmes' opinions
26 The quotation from Matthew Arnold is found in the essay
MacMillan Company.
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on the constitutionality of the exercise by the states of a police power in these matters. We turn to the final division of this first section now and discuss the opinions
concerning the problems of integration and size.
Integration of an industry creates continuity in the productive process. It is
described in United Slates v. United States Steel Corporation2 7 as a facility of industrial progress based on the need and value of continuity in manufacture from the
ore to the finished product. Integration of the steel process was sustained.
Justice Holmes concurred in the decision that integration alone was not a
violation of the Sherman Act. Since Justice Holmes did not write the opinion
in the steel case we turn to National Association of lVindow Glass Manufacturers
v. United States, 28 seeking there his reasoning. That appeal brought up for review
a decree of the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio enjoining, under
the Sherman Act, an agreement between the manufacturers of hand-blown window
glass and a labor union comprising all of the labor in the industry. A wage scale
was established and issued by agreement between the union and the producers
to one set of factories for a given period and to another set for a second and different period with no factory receiving it for both periods. Labor and the means
of production were integrated. The background of the agreement rested in machinery dispensing with hand blowers of glass, fixing the price for both machine and
hand products, and reducing the trained hand workers to twenty-five hundred
men, less than enough to run the hand factories continuously. The purpose of the
arrangement was to secure employment for all of the men during the season of
production and to give all of the labor to the factories and divide it equally among
them. Justice Holmes first pointed out that the contract was not necessarily within
the Sherman Act and then turned to examine the facts. They showed human labor
disappearing before a force more ch-eaply obtainable, created by water or coal.
Thus, the agreement was based on a fact. The factories could not run at a profit
when undermanned; labor needed full employment. The integration of labor and
of the facilities of production satisfied here an economic need. Integration in and
by itself was not a violation of the Sherman Act.
Power rather than its use was the determining consideration of the Government's position in the Steel casc. Power is "unlawful regardless of purpose" and
"in ascendency there is the menace of monopoly." Thus the Court described the
contention of the Governmcnt. Integration merges into size. Size is used with the
connotation of power. The suggested measure of power is the percentage of control
in production. An uncertain rule of thumb is the result. Forty-five per cent may be
too little; ninety percent enough. The application of the rule is precarious because
the legal test is not a percentage formula but Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibiting monopolies-" Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize." Integrations are the result of planning; growth may be natural. Both result
27 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293, 64 L. Ed. 343 (1920).
28 263 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 148, 68 L. Ed. 358 (1923).
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in size. The tendency to concentration in industry and commerce has been summed
up by Professor Levi in a paper in the Chicago Law Review.2 9 He traces three
merger movements, namely 1898 to 1903, 1925 to 1929, and 1940 to 1946. The
natural trend of technological expansion and mass production has been intensified
by two wars. A divergent tendency is found in the public utility field when integration rests on securities alone. Disintegration of security control has been sanctioned there by statute. 30 Nortl3 American Company v. Securities and Exchange
Commission8' sustained the statute and an order requiring a gas and electric holding company to restore integrate units to a local economic and geographic basis.
The industrial trend, however, has been toward concentration. The cases discuss
size. The problem of integration merges with the problem of size. The Steel case
is an example.
What were Justice Holmes' views respecting size in its connotation of power?
Where did he place the decision? He used the tests of intent and attempts to
monopolize under Sec. 2 of the Act. He avoided thereby the test of size in its
connotation of power. The result was reached by construction of the statute. It
rested on legal definition. Size and power are not made the criteria. The inference
is that Justice Holmes did not believe that size in itself was either an economic
or legal test, that the scope of the Sherman Act did not exclude size in industrial
development, that Justice Holmes did not regard size as a social or economic evil
in an era of industrial expansion and technological development. The result is
placed upon an interpretation of the statute and is reached by legal definition. One
note of economic philosophy is heard and one only. The disintegration at which
the statute aimed did not reduce "all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest
degree." Justice Holmes avoided size and its connotation of power and made intent
to monopolize and attempts to monopolize the rationale of decision.
The relation of size in industrial development to the Sherman Act is stated
in the dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Company v. United States; Justice
Holmes applied and developed his reasoning in United States v.Winslow,8 ' which
passed upon a combination among manufacturers of machines designed to make
different parts of shoes. Monopoly was the test in the earlier case. Size "has nothing
to do with the matter." "A monopoly of 'any part' of the commerce among the
states is unlawful."
"There is a natural feeling that somehow or other the statute meant
to strike at combinations great enough to cause just anxiety on the part
of those who love their country more than money, while it viewed such
little ones as I have supposed with just indifference. This notion, it may
be said, somehow breathes from the pores of the act, although it seems to
be contradicted in every way by the words in detail and it has occurred to
29 14 Univ. of Chicago Law Review 153 (1947).
30 15 U. S.C. A., Sec. 79 et seq.

81 327 U.S. 686, 66 Sup. Ct. 784, 90 L.Ed. 945 (1946).
82 227 U. S.202, 33 Sup. Ct. 253, 57 L. Ed. 481 (1913).
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me that it might be that when a combination reached a certain size it
might have attributed to it more of the character of a monopoly merely
by virtue of its size than would be attributed to a smaller one. I am quite
clear that it is only in connection with monopolies that size could play any
part." (p. 407).
We mark especially the following sentence: "I am quite clear that it is only in
connection with monopolies that size could play any part." The sequence says
that size is sometimes natural and a result which becomes illegal only by intent or
by combination or conspiracy. How far did Justice Holmes go with this thought?
Let us turn to United States v. Winslow. The appeal there was from a judgment
of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts sustaining a demurrer to an
indictment under the Sherman Act containing two counts, the first under Sec. 1 of
the act alleging a combination in restraint of the trade of the defendants and the
second a conspiracy in restraint of the trade of others. A demurrer admits the truth
of the allegations and creates an issue of their sufficiency in law. The action of the
District Court on the demurrer is obscure. It apparently held that neither count was
good without further evidence. On the appeal the Supreme Court limited the issue
to the validity of the combination set out in the indictment and removed an issue
as to leases of the machinery by holding that the District Court had construed the
indictment as referring to the combination alone. The defendants manufactured
machinery for making shoes. Many of the machines were patented. Prior to the
action here challenged one defendant made sixty per cent of the lasting machines,
a second defendant -eighty per cent of the welt sewing machines and outside stitching machines and ten per cent of the lasting machines, and a third made seventy
per cent of the heeling machines and eighty per cent of the metalic fastening
machines. In 1899 the defendants organized the United Shoe Machinery Company
from the businesses of their several companies, the new company combined all of
the business into a single factory in Massachusetts and carried on all of the
business formerly done by the separate companies. Neither count in the opinion
of the Supreme Court was good. Justice Holmes noted in passing that the objective
was greater efficiency. Analyzing the facts alleged, he found that the constituent
business had been non-competitive before the combination because of the patents
and that each company supplied machinery for a separate process and that together
they did not cover the entire process of manufacture. The percentage of the control
of production was immaterial since it was the same as existed before the combination. Then turning to the law Justice Holmes restated the atom analogy used in the
Northern Securities Company dissent-"the statute does not extend to reducing
all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree." He went then to the questions of intent and attempts. The combination had not changed the situation in
respect to competition. The intent had not advanced the matter beyond its prior
stage; monopoly was no nearer accomplishment than before. The conduct was
therefore not an attempt. The approach used is intent tested by the legal sufficency
of attempt. Size is disregarded and we are on the common law implications of the
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act. The statute requires an intent and an overt act reaching the dignity of an attempt as defined in the common law.
The atom approach is rejected and legal definition of the statute is the basis
of decision. In the second part of this paper we discuss Justice Holmes' definitions
of the legal scope of the statute. The subject intrudes here since Justice Holmes
made legal definition, namely, intent and attempts, the criteria of decision in cases
where size was presented with a connotation of power. How far has Justice Holmes'
view on this issue influenced the subsequent development of the law? Some believe
that a different judicial approach to the statute is emerging at present whereby
the purpose of the statute turns to the crushing of monopolistic power per se rather
than the exclusion of coercive practices.3 3 What light do Justice Holmes' decisions
cast on the recent decisions? We shall discuss briefly two of the recent cases and
the first is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America."' The defendant's control
of the aluminum ingot market was found to be over ninety per cent and subject
only to importation from abroad. The Court held this to be a monopoly under Sec.
2 of the act and construed the statute as based on the premise that great industrial
combinations are inherently undesirable. It placed the decision, however, upon
abuse of the power in the past. The Court found unlawful practices designed to continue the original monopolistic control and to forestall competition by anticipating
all increases in the demacr-. On the matter of intent the Court wrote: "no intent
is relevant except that which is relevant to any liability, criminal or civil, i. e., an
intent to bring about the forbidden act." The acts of exclusion by anticipating demand were found to have fostered the monopoly. Thus the rationale of the decision is precisely the test that Justice Holmes applied-an intent which raised
the conduct to the dignity of an attempt-the attempt being found in the Aluminum
case to have reached accomplishment. The second recent case is American Tobacco
Co. v,. United States. 35 There we find no departure from Justice Holmes' view.
An indictment with four counts was laid against certain tobacco companies engaged
in the purchase, manufacture, and sale of tobacco products, mainly cigarettes. The
indictment rested on both sections of the act. A verdict of guilty on each of the
counts was returned. The Supreme Court granted certiorari upon the question
whether actual exclusion of competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization
under Sec. 2 of the act. The trial court had charged the jury that the joint acquisition or maintenance by the several defendants of the power to control and
dominate commerce to such an extent as to exclude competitors and with an intent
to exercise the power was within Sec. 2 of the act when it was the result of a conspiracy formed for the purpose. The charge was sustained as proper and the actual
exclusion of competitors was held immaterial. In the charge monopoly and the intent to exercise the monopolistic power were set out as necessary elements. The
38 Eugene V1 Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 UNIv. O1'
CHIcAGO LAw REvIEW 567, (1947).
34 148 F.2d 416, C. C. A. 2 (1945).
85 328 U. S. 781, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125, 90 L. Ed. 1575 (1946).
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element of conspiracy to monopolize as set out in tht charge was within the language of Sec. 2 of the act-"or combine with any other person or persons, to
monopolize a part of the trade or commerce." In reviewing the legal definitions of
the act in the second part of this paper we shall find that Justice Holmes was of the
opinion that the Sherman Act struck at conspiracies per se. The application of the
law in the two recent cases is identical with the approach used by Justice Holmes
although the view of industrial organization expressed in the Aluminum case is not
in accord with the atom analogy found in the dissent in Northern Securities Company v. United States and restated in the prevailing opinion in United States v.
Winslow.
Economic scope does not include legal definition. We met intent and attempts
at the close of the first part of this paper. These are legal terms subject to a tradition. Now we are to examine Justice Holmes' views on the legal meaning of the
statute. We shall expect an elucidation of the act in respect to common law doctrines and its relation to authorized activities.
The common law doctrines lead to a discussion of intent and the nature of conspiracy, including the effect of acts done outside the United States. The relation
of the statute to authorized activities will reveal Justice Holmes' views on the effect
of the statute on private contracts, suits under the statute by private persons, labor
unions, and patents.
What effect does intent have under the statute? The answer is found in Swift
and Company v. United States. It was argued there that the acts charged in the
indictment were lawful and that intent could make no difference. Justice Holmes
pointed first to the elements of conspiracy-the plan could make the parts unlawful. The statute struck at conspiracies in restraint of trade. If such a conspiracy was
found as a fact then there was a forbidden result. Intent was immaterial. The objedive test, established in the law of torts, created an intended result. He went on
to define the statute; it reached conspiracies in restraint of trade and attempts
to monopolize. At the common law an attempt was conduct which created a dangerous probability of a forbidden result. There, intent is important. It gives color to
acts not sufficient in themselves to produce the forbidden result. In attempts, the
acts in themselves may not be sufficient to bring about the forbidden result. Taken
with the intent however the dangerous probability may exist. The statute strikes at
dangetous probabilities as well as completed results.
Intent is further clarified when we examine Justice Holmes' definition of conspiracy. In Nash v. United States36 there was an indictment under both sections of
the act and each alleged a conspiracy. On demurrer it was argued that the indictment did not set forth an overt act. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes held
that the statute punished conspiracies on a common law footing and did not make
86 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232 (1913).
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the doing of any act other than the act of conspiracy a condition of liability. Both
sections of the act are therefore directed at conspiracies per se.
Does a conspiracy differ from a contract? Justice Holmes held a conspiracy
in restraint of trade to be more than a contract in restraint of trade in that it is
the result of the contract. In United States v. Kissel37 it was argued that the statute
of limitations was a plea in bar to an indictment which alleged an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade extending from 1903 to date and alleged overt acts
in pursuance of the conspiracy within the limitations period. The plea, Justice
Holmes held, was a denial only and not a bar to the action. A conspiracy is indeed
an agreement; but its legal force may not be exhausted by the initial act. It is the
result of an agreement. It may involve the continuous cooperation of the conspirators. It is neither exhausted by the original act nor do the successive acts create a
series of distinct conspiracies. The continuando may not be disregarded; and if
found, the statute of limitations does not bar a prosecution for a conspiracy resulting
from an agreement made before the three year period.
What conspiracies does the statute reach in respect to territory? Commerce in
scope is international. Secs. 1 and 2 of the statute include commerce with foreign
nations by express reference. Justice Holmes construed the statute as addressed to
persons within the power of the courts. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.88 a suit was brought for triple damages under Sec. 7 of the act alleging that
the government of Costa Rica had used its power and soldiers to seize the plaintiff's banana plantation with the purpose of creating a monopoly in the defendant
which had instigated the governmental action. The acts of a sovereign are not unlawful and a conspiracy in the United States could not make them so. Here the
conspiracy was outside the United States. Where the conspiracy is set in motion
by persons in the United States, and by steps taken in the United States, the Sherman Act reaches it. Justice Holmes concurred in United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation39 in which the Court sustained a bill to enjoin a conspiracy between residents of the United States and Mexico to monopolize the importation into the
United States from Mexico of fibers used for the manufacture of binder twine.
The current law follows the distinction and is illustrated by United States v. National Lead Co.' 0 There a conspiracy to control world commerce in titanium, an ore
especialy suitable for the manufacture of white paint, was enjoined upon proof
that the conspiracy was entered into the United States by acts done in the United
States and abroad.
In respect to common law doctrines Justice Holmes related intent to the statute
by tht objectives of the statute. Intent was material only in so far as it gave meaning to the facts and the statutory requirements. He defined the statute as aimed at
87
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conspiracies on the common law basis, i. e., per se. He separated contract from
conspiracy, treating the latter as a result capable of continuity. He limited the
statute to conspiracies supported by acts done in the United States.
What is the relation of the Sherman Act to the ,authorized forms of activity?
Did Justice Holmes seek there to reconcile the statute with the established forms?
Or did he restrict the act by interpretation? In the main he tended to restrict the
statute by interpretation. In these types of conflicts he never gave the statute an
over-riding weight. Let us turn to specific applications in the opinions.
The taint of illegality created by the statute does not invalidate private contracts made with the violator. On this point Justice Holmes was in the minority.
In Continental Wall Paper Company v. Voight and Sons Company41 the corporate
plaintiff was the result of a combination to restrain trade in the manufacture and
sale of wall paper. The defendant was compelled to sign a contract to buy its requirements from the plaintiff at fixed prices and to covenant that it would not sell
at lower prices or on better terms than the plaintiff. After purchasing wall paper
and accepting delivery the defendant refused to pay the purchase price; when sued
it set up the illegality of the combination as a defense. Upon demurrer the Supreme
Court held that the defense was good. Justice Holmes dissented: the action was
not upon the general agreement but upon distinct transactions; the defendant was
an unwilling actor in the general agreement and it neither alleged duress nor rescinded nor offered to pay the reasonable price. The rationale of the dissent is that
the illegality does not extend beyond the field marked out by the statute-"the
policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is less important than the policy
of preventing people from getting other people's property for nothing when they
purport to be buying it." In recent decisions the Court tends to follow Justice
Holmes' view but not without reservations and distinctions. Bruce's juices Inc. v.
American Can Company,42 which involved the Robinson-Patman Act, is an example. There the defense was rejected.
Strict construction appears also in those opinions of Justice Holmes concerning suits under the statute by private persons. In Fleitmann v. Welsback Co. 43 a
stockholder of a corporation brought a bill in equity joining the corporation in
which he held stock and oth'er corporations and also individuals and asking triple
damages under Sec. 7 of the act alleging that the defendants had secured control of the plaintiff's company pursuant to a conspiracy directed to the control of
municipal lighting in the United States and had then driven the corporation out
of business by misconduct of its affairs. The action was therefore a stockholders
action brought on behalf of a corporation and its stockholders. Justice Holmes
sustained a dismissal of the bill. The statute as it then read allowed an action at
law; the stockholder could not cut off the right of a jury trial provided in the act
41 212 U. S. 227, 29 Sup. Ct. 280, 53 L. Ed. 486 (1909).
42 330 U. S. 743, 67 Sup. Ct. 1015, 91 L. Ed. 875 (1947).
43 240 U. S. 27, 36 Sup. Ct. 233, 60 L. Ed. 505 (1916).
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by resorting to equity doctrines. Common law doctrine was followed here in limiting the statute. In Paine Lumber Co. v. Nea44 manufacturers of doors and sashes
brought a bill in equity to enjoin a labor union from continuing a secondary boycott and alleging that there was a restraint of trade under the act. Writing for the
majority Justice Holmes held that a private person could not maintain a suit for
an injunction under Sec. 4 of the act. The act is limited in these decisions by construction, held within the framework of the common law, and treated as a criminal
statute adapted to public rather than private uses, while recognizing the private
right of action for triple damages, subject to the common law right of trial by
jury. Congress did not share this view. An amendment of the statute in 1914 gave
private persons the right to sue in equity for injunctive relief and authorized th
issuance of preliminary injunctions upon a showing of probable irreparable loss
or damage and the giving of a bond."1
Organized labor and the Sherman Act: What part did Justice Holmes take
in the elusive effort to reach definition? We find little in direct expression. There
are concurrences in majority opinions and in diss-ents. We lack, except in one instance that concerns the law of agency, the benefit of opinions. The concurrences
and dissents, however, reflect an attitude and project a pattern. Justice Holmes
joined in the decision in Loewe v. Lawlor" wherein the Court held that a boycott conducted by a labor organization was within the Sherman Act when a restraint of trade is shown, and that the injured manufacturer may maintain an action for triple damages under Sec. 7 of the act. The Clayton Act of 1914 provided
in Sec. 6 that labor organizations should not be construed as illegal combinations
in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. This amendment was tested in Duplex
Co. v. Deering,47 which was a suit in equity by a manufacturer of printing presses
to restrain a boycott. The majority of the Court pointing to the words "lawful"
and "legitimate" in the amendment and to the use of a secondary boycott beyond
the immediate labor dispute held that the Clayton Act was not a bar. Bedford Cut
48
Stone Company v. journeymen Stone Cutters Association of North America followed the same line. In each of these cases Justice Holmes joined in the dissenting
opinion which went on the ground that the Clayton Act expressly stated that the
conduct involved should not be a violation of any law of the United States. We infer that Justice Holmes was of the opinion that Congress had limited the Sherman
Act by Sec. 6 of the Clayton Act. Limitation rather than reconciliation marks the
opinions where the issues concern conflicts between the Sherman Act and authorized activities.
Justice Holmes' judicial work touches labor organizations at one other point,
namely, the liability of the members of the union for acts of officers. After the
44 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718, 61 L. Ed. 1256 (1917).
45 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 26.
46 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488 (1908).

47 254 U. S.443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1921).

48 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916 (1927).
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Supreme Court had sustained the cause of action, Loewe v. Lawlor was tried and
the plaintiffs had a verdict. The case went to the Supreme Court again upon the
appeal from the judgment. 49 The sole issue was the authority of the officers of
the union to create liability in the members. Justice Holmes writing for the Court
applied the common law of agency, namely, the delegated authority and what the
members knew or ought to have known of the acts of the officers to whom authority had been delegated. The judgment was affirmed. Congress disagreed with this
application of the common law and in Sec. 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia act provided
that in order to create liability in members of a union there must be clear proof of
actual participation, or actual authorization or ratification after actual knowledge of
the acts. In view of this statute the rule applied by Justice Holmes in Lawlor v.
Loewe, namely, the scope of the authority, was rejected in Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States o decided at the 1946 term of the Court.
Patents raise two questions which concern monopolies and restraint of trade;
first, the conflict between the patent monopoly and the Sherman Act; secondly, the
extent of the monopoly created by the patent statute.
Agreements respecting patents may create a combination respecting patents.
Justice Holmes noted that the action so taken is in the field of public policy which
is in the control of Congress. The Sherman Act expresses the policy.
The extent of the monopoly granted by the patent is a matter of greater difficulty. The policy stated in the Sherman Act casts a shadow there. Justice Holmes
was of the opinion that the Sherman Act does not extend to the construction of
grants under the patent statutes. In the first part of this paper we found Justice
Holmes stating that desires fix prices. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons
Co. he could see no ultimate harm in a vendor's fixing a resale price by agreement.
The thought reappears in the patent field. When it was urged that the exercise of
the monopoly of use would result in domination, Justice Holmes answered that
the resulting domination "is one only to the extent of the desire for the teapot or
film feeder, and if the owner prefers to keep the pot or feeder unless you will buy
his tea or films, I cannot see in allowing him the right to do so anything more than
an ordinary incident of ownership, or at most, a consequence of the Paper Bag
case - - - ." This idea assumes and confides in the economic law of a free market;
it overlooks the demand and the need for mass consumption and use. Let us note at
once that in these views Justice Holmes was in a minority. The difference between
Justice Holmes and his colleagues goes to the root of the subsequent litigation respecting patents which has been extensive and which is difficult to synthesize. The
difference is stated in Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company5 l and the view of the majority in that decision is the basis of
49 Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170, 59 L. Ed. 341 (1915).
50 330 U. S. 395, 67 Sup. Ct. 775, 91 L. Ed. 705 (1947).
51 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 61 L. Ed. 871 (1917).
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the last decided case-TransparentWrap Machine Corporationv. Stokes and Smith
Co.52 where the opinion is by Justice Douglas.
In a series of cases the Court held that a patentee could not, where title had
passed, fix by notice the retail price at which sales could be made. In each of these
53
cases Justice Holmes without opinion dissented. Bauer and Co. v. O'Donnell;
Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.;"1 Boston Store of Chicago v. American
Graphophone Company. 56
Congress followed the majority. The Clayton Act provided in Sec. 3 that sales
or leases of goods, either patented or not, conditioned upon a fixing of prices, or an
agreement not to use the goods of a competitor, are unlawful where the effect is to
substantially lessen competition.
Motion Picture Palents Company v. Universal Fiha Manufacturin- Company
was decided on the same day as the Straus case. It came up by certiorari from the
Second Circuit. The action was for the infringement of a patent. The plaintiff
owned a patent for a mechanism designed to feed film in a uniform and accurate
movement through a motion picture projector; it licensed the Precision Machine
Company to manufacture and sell the machines with a restriction however that
the machines be used solely to project film covered by another patent owned by
the plaintiff and upon other terms and conditions fixed by the plaintiff. A plate
on the machine stated the restrictive terms of the license. The licensee sold one of
the machines to the operator of a motion picture theatre in New York City, which
later sublet the theatre to another. The Universal Film Manufacturing Company
made film and sold it to an exchange which supplied it to the sublessor of the
theatre for use in the machine and it was used. The patent on the film described
in the license restriction had in the meantime expired. The plaintiff gave notice and
then brought its action for an infringement of the patent covering the feeding
mechanism. The District Court dismissed the bill; the Supreme Court affirmed.
The majority were of the opinion that the patentee was limited to the exact grant;
and therefore, the materials used in the patented device fell under the general law;
that the patent owner's election to use the invention was limited by the grant; that
after title had passed restrictions could not attach since they opened the way to
a monopoly which had not been granted; that the public benefit was the primary
object of the patent statutes and that the concept of private benefit had been urged
only after the corporate organization of business. Dissenting, Justice Holmes noted
that the patent was property and the owner could permit use of it or not. The
condition was therefore lawful and not an attempt to e~cend the monopoly to unpatented articles. Domination could not escape the economic law of the market.
Buyers were free to reject the offer if they desired, The patentee had the legal right
52 329 U. S. 637, 67 Sup. Ct. 610, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
58 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 57 L. Ed. 1041 (1913).
54 243 U. S. 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 412, 61 L. Ed. 866 (1917).
55 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257, 62 L, Ed. 551 (1918).
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to keep the invention if the incentive to buy his materials was not sufficient. He
added that the contrary prior decisions in the lower courts, long undisturbed, had
tended to create a rule of property.
In summary: Justice Homes used the common law doctrines to give flexibility
the
Sherman Act. He related intent to the statutory objectives whereby it became
to
material in some cases, immaterial in others, according as it gave color to the overt
acts or not. He completed the thought by putting conspiracy on the footing of an
illegal act per se. In relating the statute to authorized activities Justice Holmes
limited the statute; he hardly ever attempted reconciliation. He did not allow the
statute to cast a shadow; he gave it only a coordinate place with recognized activities. In arguing this position in respect to patents, he reasserted a belief in the power
of a free market to resist domination. The patentee, like the vendor of the patent
medicine who wished to fix the resale price by agreement, would find himself
bound by the inexorable economic law set in motion by a balancing of costs and
desires. Justice Holmes was fully conscious of the concentration in industry which
marked his era. The mass production was leading to the necessity of mass consumption and a demand for mass use. Justice Holmes rested, however, upon the free
market and therefore saw no need for limiting property rights.
The states have a concurrent power over monopolies and restraint of trade
subject, however, to the political and property rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution and more especially by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
excluding discrimination, arbitrary action, and interference with contract and property rights. We reach the third part of our paper now and turn to the views which
Justice Holmes expressed on this subject.
The issues which came before the Court arose in a large degree from economic
conditions similar to those we found in the background of the cases which concerned the Sherman Act. Over production, especially in agricultural products,
motivates many of the statutes which the Court reviewed. We meet distress sugar.
State statutes reflect a determined opposition to discrimination. The remedy
often takes the form of an indirect price fixing. The objective is not only to remove
discrimination. It reaches beyond uniform price to a restraint on price cutting directed to the object of driving out competition in the interest of future monopoly.
There is also an unexpressed effort to open up to general use and enjoyment the
goods and facilities of the community. The ordinance fixing the price for the resale of theatre tickets is an example.
The issues to be decided here are quite different from those discussed in the
first two parts of this article. Here we are not concerned with economic scope
or legal definition. The issue is whether the action taken by the state is permissible
under the Constitution of the United States. It does not renew the earlier struggle
between Hamilton's concept of a strong central government and Jefferson's concept of local government. It reflects, however, the Jeffersonian idea. Justice Holmes
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was prepared to go a long way in that direction. The legal means he used were a
limitation of the constitutional restraints and a new concept of the police power.
Limitation of the constitutional controls did not originate with Justice Holmes.
There are opinions by other justices which sustain the powers of the states. The
Court in this period was moving from- an abstract to a factual application of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The contribution which Justice Holmes made was the
rationalization of the attitude. He gave the idea form. He reduced it to legal concept. Later the concepts which Justice Holmes developed here were generalized and
gave impetus to the more flexible constitutional concepts of the later period. We
are not concerned with that aspect of Justice Holmes' influence here. We are reviewing the opinions dealing with the powers of the states over monopolies -and
restraint of trade. We are seeking the ideas which Justice Holmes developed in the
conflicts between the exercise of power by the states in this field and the Fourteenth
Amendment. These are found in three legal formulas, namely, classification,
standards of action, and freedom of contract. Is a statute operating on a specific
evil-a particular form of restraint or monopoly-arbitrary because of classification? What standards must the states follow if any? Is regulation an arbitrary restraint of the freedom of contract? These are the points on which we shall seek
legal definition. We shall review the opinions for the purpose of finding these
definitions and the bases on which they were developed. We shall find that the
scales were retained. If Justice Holmes was prepared to limit the constitutional restraints, he had, however, no patience with action which did not conform to legal
tradition. He insisted upon legal standards of action.
Upon one point Justice Holmes went beyond the majority of the Court and
broke new ground. The discussion of freedom of contract led finally to a discussion
of the police power and of business charged with a public interest. There Justice
Holmes gave a new definition. It was a minority view. It was a minority view which
was to travel far. It was a minority view which was later to become the law of the
Court. It was a minority view which created a political concept for the expansion
of the powers of the federal government during the decade of the thirties in order
that it might grapple with a catastrophic economic depression. It was used as a
legal concept to enable the states to do their parts while an expansion of the power
over commerce enabled the federal government to do its part.
May a state legislature pick out a conspicious example in a field of activity
which it believes inimical to the public interest and deal with that activity without
covering the entire field? Where a particular class of activity is singled out does
a denial of the equal protection of the laws result? Logical doctrine is not required,
Justice Holmes held, by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carroll v,
Greenwich Insurance Co.5 6 came to the Court on appeal from the District Court in
Iowa. An Iowa statute made it a misdemeanor for officers, agents or employees
56 199 U. S. 401, 26 Sup. Ct. 66, 50 L. Ed. 246 (1905).
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of two or more fire insurance companies to enter into an agreement relating to
rates, commissions to be paid agents, or the manner of transacting business. A
bill in equity was brought to restrain enforcement of the statute. It was argued that
a particular line of business had been singled out. It happened that Iowa had a
general statute prohibiting all contracts or combinations to fix prices. Justice
Holmes did not rest on that point. He went on to hold that if an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business and the state legislature, acting on
practical experience, had so decided, by the legislative process, the prohibition
need not be stated in all embracing terms. In CentralLumber Co. v. South Dakota57
a South Dakota statute forbade discrimination between different sections of the
state by selling a commodity at a lower rate in one section of the state than in another. It was argu'ed that the statute affected only a particular class and, in singling
out dealers who had several lumber yards, operated in the interest of independent
iealers. Justice Holmes replied that a legislature may direct its law against what it
caeems the evil without covering the whole field of possible abuses even if the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those allowed. Legislation which is special
in character is not forbidden where the policy is not purely arbitrary. A conspicious
example may be dealt with although logically it may not be distinguished from
others not embraced in the prohibition. In these cases we find a definition-arbitrary exercise of power-and a recognition of the legislative process as a means
of determining public policy.
The point came back to the Court in 1940 in Tigner v. Texas."8 There the
petitioner had been indicted under the Texas anti-trust statute for participation in
a conspiracy to fix the retail price of beer. The statute provided that it should not
apply to agricultural products or live stock in the hands of a producer or raiser.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 59 which had invalidated a statute with a like
exemption, was urged. The Court found an historical basis for the exemption in
the statute and cited Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co. in overrulling the Connolly
case.
Justice Holmes applied the same reasoning in respect to the remedies open to
the states in the enforcement of their anti-trust statutes. In Standard Oil Company
of Kentucky v. Tennessee" a decree had been entered against the appellant forbidding it to do any business, other than interstate commerce, in Tennessee. It
was grounded upon a finding of a violation of the state anti-trust act. The statute
made a violation of it a crime punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. By a
separate provision it directed that every foreign corporation which violated the
statute should be denied the right to do business in the state. The charter of a
domestic corporation violating the statute was forfeited. The attorney general was
V1 226 U.
58 31o U.
59 184 U.
60 217 U.

S. 157,
S. 141,
S. 540,
S. 413,

33 Sup. Ct. 66, 57 L. Ed. 164 (1912).
60 Sup. Ct. 879, 84 L. Ed. 1124 (1940).
22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679 (1902).
30 Sup. Ct. 543, 54 L. Ed. 817 (1910).
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directed to enforce the provisions of the statute by due process of law. The statute
was challenged on the ground of equal protection of the laws. Justice Holmes pointed out that natural persons had under the statute the advantages afforded by the
criminal law while the attorney general could proceed against corporations by a bill
in equity and without any of the forms of the criminal law except perhaps trial by
jury. However, the Fourteenth Amendment allowed practical differences to be met
by corresponding differences of treatment. A threat of fine or imprisonment might
be efficient for men. In the case of corporations, imprisonment is impossible and
fines less serious. The threat of ouster is more likely to achieve the result. There was,
therefore, no inequality of which the appellant could complain.
The ideas which we find in these three cases are: legislation may proceed
upon a cautious advance and a distrust of generalities, which is the traditional
legislative approach; and legislators, proceeding on practical experience, may reach,
through the legislative process, results of limited application; and neither cautious
advance nor limited application invalidates the result of the legislative process
under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The reference to the legislative process here is significant. Justice Holmes developed this concept further in
the cases discussing the nature of the police power of the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment-cases which we shall reach later.
What standards are required in the statutory definition of state action? Does
vagueness of definition invade the due process clause? Does the other extreme,
namely, singleness of purpose, invade the equal protection clause? Justice Holmes
wrote law on these points which was decisive, penetrating and elucidative.
First we shall consider standards in relation to definiteness. The background
of our first case brings to us again the realization of conflict--conflict between
the interests of industry and agriculture. Reconciliation had been attempted by a
state statute. Justice Holmes rejected the effort as an invasion of the due process
clause. He reasserted his concept of the free market and defined value. Kentucky
solved the problem of price in industry and agriculture by enacting two statutes.
The statute of 1890 and the constitution forbade trusts to combine for the purpose
of depreciating an article below its real value or enhancing the cost of an article
above its real value. The statute of 1906 made it lawful for any number of persons
to combine crops of wheat, tobacco, corn, oats, hay, or other farm products, which
they had raised, for the purpose of obtaining a better price than separate sales would
bring. In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 61 the appellant had been indicted and convicted in three separate counties for entering into agreements with
other companies for the purpose of fixing the price of harvesters and fixing the
price above the real value. The Kentucky Supreme Court reconciled the statutes
as making combinations for the purpose of controlling prices lawful unless entered
upon for the purpose or with the effect of fixing a price greater or less than the
61
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real value. It defined real value as the market value under fair competition and
normal market conditions. Writing for the Court Justice Holmes declared this
application of the law invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. He passed by the
claim of unequal protection and thereby avoided any approval of the Connolly
case which the Court later overruled. He went to the due process clause and found
that no standard of conduct had been established. A person was required to guess
at his peril what his product would have sold for if combinations had not existed
and nothing else affecting values had occurred. He reiterated what he had stated
in the dissent in the Arorthern Securities case, namely, that combinations are a part
of modern reality-"- - - if business is to go on, men must unite to do it and must
sell their wares." He restated the economic concept of value that he had expressed
in the Dr. Miles Medical Co. and Motion PicturePatents cases: "Value is the effect
in exchange of the relative social desire for compared objects expressed in terms
of a common denominator."
Next we meet distress sugar cane. Louisiana sought to meet the problem of
overproduction and its effect on prices. It enacted a statute that was generally directed to the continuous operation of the refineries in the state and against the
depression of the price paid for the cane. It set up an elaborate system of administrative control. However, it contained a provision that the systematic paying of a less
price in Louisiana for sugar can'e than the price paid in any other state would make
the person so doing presumptively a party to a conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade and subject to penalties. The provisions respecting the operation
of the refineries indicated that the statute was directed at the American Sugar Refining Co. The statute was held invalid under the equal protection clause. Justice
Holmes noted that it operated by its terms on refineries operating in the state and
that a powerful rival not operating refineries in the state might systematically pay
a less price for sugar cane in the state with none of the consequences set up in the
statute. This case is McFarland v. American Sugar Co.62
Time brought new approaches to the economic problems which these cases
disclosed. Agriculture was distinguished from industry and an exception permitted
in state statutes. The cooperative movement developed. Federal statutes regulated
production. Administrative law developed. The power to make rules ,Ind regulations was delegated to administrators. The equality of treatment and definiteness
in the exercise of the regulatory power which developed with the new forms of approach find their justification and elucidation in these opinions of Justice Holmes.
The necessity of a standard of conduct with the definiteness of that established
in the law of torts was of such basic validity that it survived all changes and asserted itself in the new administrative forms.
"- - - nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." How far is the right of contract protected by these words
62 241 U. S. 79, 36 Sup. Ct. 498, 60 L. Ed. 899 (1916).
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in the Fourteenth Amendment? Is the contract right a liberty or property which is
beyond regulation? Does the clause merely exclude arbitrary restraint? Does it permit reasonable regulation and prohibition imposed in the interest of the community?
On this issue Justice Holmes developed ideas which became "first a catechism
and then a code." He uttered the ideas in the pursuit of thought and not by way of
taking sides in differences of opinion assumed to be decisive in the destiny of man.
No one was freer than he of the illusion that the decision of a case one way rather
than another might bring the world to an end. Here destiny entered his thought,
if at all, no further than a happy willingness to go along with the great experiment
in popular government which had been undertaken on this continent and which he
had expressed with precision and power in the Abrams dissent-'"It is an experiment as all life is an experiment."
Here he was pursuing also the precise relationship between the thought and
the expression. He was analyzing words to ascertain meaning and searching for
words to denote a thought. The discussion of the Amendment in the Court had led
to two phrases-"the police power", and "business clothed with a public interest".
Justice Holmes, finding no limitation in the Constitution, dismissed the first phrase
as an apology and the second as a fiction "intended to beautify what is disagreeable
to the sufferers". Beyond this analysis of words in the light of reality there is but
one expression of political application-"We fear to grant power and are unwilling to recognize it when it exists."
This insistence on a relationship between language and thought may have
been also a summary of the judicial trend and a charting of the deep and silent current of the law. The events that later threw a new light on Justice Holmes' ideas
were an economic emergency which demanded sweeping state and federal action
in order to stay its force, and, later, a challenge to the democratic theory and to
proceeding with the experiment free from fear.
We have but two cases to examine. First we go back to Central Lumber Co.
v. South Dakota. The statute made it a crime to destroy competition by selling at
a lower rate in one section than in another. In addition to the equal protection point
which we have already considered it was argued that the statute interfered with
freedom of contract. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, in sustaining the statute
disposed of the point in respect to the interference with freedom of contract in
these words: "as the law does not otherwise encounter the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is not to be disturbed on-this ground." This is the genesis of Justice Holmes' idea.
Alone the point respecting freedom of contract was not sufficient. Later the idea
was rejected by the Court and became the subject of a shattering dissent.
The dissent was written in Tyson and Brother v. Banton. 63 A New York
statute declared that the price of admission to theaters was affected with a public
68 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718 (1927).
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interest. Those engaged in the resale of tickets were required to secure a license.
It forbade the resale of any ticket at a price in excess of fifty cents over the price
printed on the ticket. A suit in equity was brought in the United States District
Court to restrain the enforcement of the statute. The bill was dismissed; there was
an appeal to the Supreme Court; and there the majority held that an owner's right
to fix the price at which property is sold or used is an attribute of property and
within the due process clause. The majority also rejected the legislative declaration
that places of entertainment and admission therein are affected with a public interest. The dissenting opinions of Justices Stone and Sanford developed the material
fact from the record that the brokerage business as it had developed prior to the
statute had created a virtual monopoly of the best seats.
Justice Holmes in his dissent held that the New York legislature had the
power to enact the statute under the provisions of the due process clause. A state
legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States. Subject to compensation, when
compensation is due, a state legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it
has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it. People had come to believe that
theaters were devoted to a public use. The police power and the notion that a business is clothed with a public interest were apologies and fictions used to beautify
what may be disagreeable. They had no denotation in thought. Even if fashionable
conventions were applied here theaters were as much devoted to public use as anything could be.
The dissent in its full sweep subsequently became the law of the Court. In
Nebbia v. New York64 the power of the New York legislature to regulate the price
of milk was sustained. The power of the federal government under the similar
clause in the Fifth Amendment was sustained in United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative6 5 and Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins.6 6 The statute struck down in Tyson
and Brother v. Banton was reenacted in New York and sustained in Kelly and Sullivan v. Moss. 67 The sanctions for the economic changes and controls emerging after
1932 found their legal footing in this dissent and in a sharper emphasis on the
commerce power. Power was granted and recognized where it existed.
We may sum these cases up and characterize this phase of Justice Holmes'
work as an effort to secure a coordination of thought with expression. Definition
must precede understanding. It opens the roadway on which action may travel.
Definition here opened the way to legislative action as a means of economic and
social control. Monopoly and restraint of trade became subject to control by legislation directed at price. The result invaded the Lockeian concept of property.
The era of mass' consumption and mass use was following logically on the already
64
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fully developed process of mass production. The attitude in these opinions is radical
only to the extent that Justice Holmes had found Justice William Allen-a colleague in the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the early nineties-radical:
"As with others whom I have known that were brought up in similar
surroundings, his Yankee caution and sound judgment were leavened
with a touch of enthusiasm capable of becoming radical at moments, and
his cultivation had destroyed rather than fostered his respect for the old
merely as such." 6 8
To those who reach into tht world of ideas and coordinate thought and expression so that action is possible, humanit is indebted. The conservative or radical
coloring of the resulting action does not count. The free play of ideas is the value
and creates the eternal values.
"Unless we are to accept decadence as the necessary end of civilization,
we should be grateful to all men like William Allen, whose ambition, if
it can be called so, looks only to remote and mediated command; who
do not ask to say to anyone, Go, and he goeth, so long as in truthful imagination they wield, according to their degree, that most subtile and intoxicating authority which controls the future from within by shaping
the thoughts and speech of a later time."
The right of every person and business to be free of coercion, economic or
political-a sense of the expansive nature of modern industry-the subjection of
price to the test of monopoly and a free market-the subordination of size and integration to the test of monopoly-the reference of the Sherman Act in its legal
aspects to the background of the common law-the correlation of the statute to
the established forms of activity as an equal among equals--property rights as
the basis of action but subject to regulation by due exercise of the legislative process within the constitutional limitations--expression as the projection of thought,
denotative words-these summarize the thought which we have here found. Thi3
thought, charged by an endeavor to bring reality and intellectual and emotional
ideals into accord, glows. Its influence, reaching beyond acceptance in case and
statute law and in popular thought, merges and is lost in the universal and omnipresent effort of art to place life on a plane where it has meaning.
68, 154 Mass. 607 (1891).

